A Model of Public Debt Issue
The model applies to a large national government that has jurisdiction over a population of exogenous size. The analysis therefore neglects any effects of public debt policy on migration, which would be an important consideration for a local government. The govern-ment is assumed to finance its expenditures through two methods: current taxation and public debt issue. I do not deal here with currency issue, although for some purposes this type of finance could be included as one form of current taxation. The composition of taxes, by type or degree of graduation, is taken as given. The volume of real government expenditure, aside from interest payments on the public debt, during period t is denoted by Gt and is assumed to be exogenous. Hence, the present analysis does not deal with the determination of the size of the public sector. Future values of G and of other exogenous variables are treated as though known with certainty. Real tax revenue obtained by the government in each period is designated by T1, and aggregate real income (treated as exogenous) by Yt. The real stock of public debt outstanding at the end of period t is denoted by bt, where this debt can be assumed at this stage to take the form of one-period, single-coupon bonds that are issued at par. I assume initially that the price level, P, is (and is expected to be) constant over time, and the real (=nominal) rate of return on public and private debts, r, is also a constant.3 The government's budget equation in each period is G, + rbt-1 -,Tt + (bt -bt1),
where interest payments during period t are assumed to apply to the stock of debt outstanding at the beginning of the period. The government's budget equation at each date t, together with an additional condition that rules out perpetual debt finance, implies the overall budget constraint,
[GtI(l + r)t] + bo = E [Ttl(l + r)t].
(2) l l This condition-which equates the present value of government expenditure (aside from interest payments) plus initial debt to the present value of taxes-follows from equation (1) as long as b is constrained to grow asymptotically at a rate below r.4
3 Implicit in this condition is the assumption that the required real rate of return on public debt, relative to that on private debt, is invariant with the quantity of government debt outstanding. If the quantity of public debt approaches the government's collateral-in the sense of the present value of its future taxing capacity-then the risk of the government's default would have to be taken into account (see Barro 1976b, p. 343). Alternatively, if government debt were perceived as net wealth by the private sector, then the quantity of debt could influence real rates of return in the economy (see, e.g., Barro 1974 Barro , p. 1096 . 4 In the efficient case where r exceeds the growth rate of real income, this condition requires a bound on the asymptotic debt-income ratio (see Barro 1976b , pp. 343-45). Presumably, this ratio cannot, in fact, exceed the finite value implied by the government's collateral (n. 3 above).
The sum of the present value of government expenditures and the initial debt level, which appears on the left side of equation (2) and is exogenously given, determines the present value of government tax receipts. However, the fixity of this last present value leaves open the determination of the time pattern of taxes. It is assumed that taxation involves not only a one-to-one transfer of purchasing power from individuals to the government but also some collection costs and/or indirect misallocation costs that are imposed on the private economy. That is, the "production" of government revenue involves the using up of some resources in the sense of costs that are often referred to as "deadweight losses" or "excess burdens." For a given present value of net tax revenues (as fixed by the present value of expenditures and the initial debt level), the present value of these extra costs would generally depend on the distribution of taxes by type and timing. The present analysis, which focuses on the timing of taxes, abstracts from the determination of tax composition at a point in time. Essentially, the analysis of timing is conditional on the selection of an 'optimal" tax composition that underlies the 'production function" relation between net tax receipts and "excess burden" that is specified below.
For the case of direct collection costs for administration, enforcement, and so on, let Z, represent the real cost incurred and Yt the real national income in period t.5 I assume that Z, depends positively, with a positive second derivative, on the total net tax take for the period Tt and negatively on the pool of contemporaneously taxable resources Yi, but not on the values of taxes or incomes in other periods. Further, I neglect any special relation of collection costs to the contemporaneous government spending level G,." Finally, I assume the homogeneity condition that a doubling of net tax collections Tf and potential tax pool Yt doubles the collection cost Z,. Therefore, the collection cost for period t can be written as Zt = F(rt, Yt) =-Tf(rtlY),
wheref' > 0, and the functions is assumed to be invariant over time. The present value of collection costs is then given by Z = >j7tf(Tt/Yt)/(1 + r)t.
t=I I have not included the collection costs as components of government spending in eq. (1), although the analysis could be altered in that manner without affecting any substantive results. Independence of national income levels from the choice of the time path of taxes is assumed to hold as a first-order approximation-essentially, the deadweight losses from taxation are assumed to constitute only a small fraction of GNP. 6 Such an effect might arise if, e.g., the influence of war on "patriotism" lowers the administrative costs of raising taxes during wartime.
At the present time (date 1) the government is confronted by an exogenous series of planned expenditures, G, G2, . . ., which it must finance at each date; by a series of (anticipated) real income values, Y1, Y2, . . .; the interest rate r; and an initial stock of debt, b(?. The overall budget condition in equation (2) fixes the present value of net tax collections. Given this present value, the government's objective is taken to be the minimization of the present value of the resources consumed by the process of revenue generation, Z, as shown in equation (4). This general form of the objective is similar to ones set up by Prescott (1977) and Barro (1976a) .
The assumed objective of the government-that it pursues a costminimization policy involving the economization of revenue-raising costs-can be reconciled with various models of public sector behavior. For example, the setup seems consistent with a public-interest theory of government, with a model of self-interested politicians who are subject to "effective" electoral control, and with a model of a political dictator who maximizes own utility. The objective would not seem to apply if the institutional structure were such that "political income" was directly related to the amount of deadweight loss generated by the government. The government's optimization problem amounts to choosingTi, T2, . , to minimize the present value of revenue-raising costs, subject to the form of the cost function in equation (4) and the overall budget constraint in equation (2). The resulting first-order conditions, which can be obtained in the usual manner, require the marginal collection cost for raising taxes-9Z,/0r-to be the same in all periods (without regard to the value of r, because tax revenue and the associated collection cost arise at the same point in time). With the homogeneous specification of costs in equation (4), these conditions require the tax rate, ilY, to be equal in all periods. The (planned) constancy of this ratio is the key to the subsequent analysis.7 Given that the tax-income The choice of taxes over time can also be considered in terms of an objective that encompasses distortion costs on the private economy. I have considered only a simple model in which the representative individual receives utility from leisure and a single consumption good in each period, where any satisfaction provided by government services in various periods is separable from the utility provided by consumption and leisure, where interest income is untaxed, and where the present values of all producer prices are constant. This constancy would obtain if production were subject to constant returns to scale (which means that the model does not deal with capital accumulation in a serious way) and if the interest rate were fixed. One justification for the latter would be a small-country setting in which the domestic interest rate was tied to the exogenous return available internationally. The optimal taxation literature, as in Sandmo (1974) and Sadka (1977), can then be applied to determine the time pattern of consumption and leisure taxes that maximizes the utility of the representative individual, given the present value of tax collections. E.g., for the case where leisure in each period is untaxed, uniform consumption taxation over time emerges if the compensated elasticity of consumer demand in period i with respect to the present-value wage for any ratio is constant, the level of taxes in each period is determined from the given values of (Y, . .. ), ( 
Constant Rate of Growth of Income and Government Expenditure
Suppose now that aggregate real income grows at the constant rate p, so that Yt = YO(I + p)t. In order for the present value of future income to be finite (i.e., to be in the efficient case referred to in n. 4 above), it must be that r > p. Government expenditure is assumed to grow at rate y, so that Gt = G0( 1 + y)t. In order for GIY < I to hold at all times, it must be that y p < r.8 Clearly, p = y is the only specification within period j is independent of the index i. Since the tax-income ratio is still constant in the optimal solution it follows that taxes grow at the same rate as income-that is, rt =( 1 + p)'. Using the budget condition of equation (2) 
For the case where income and government expenditure grow at a common rate, p = y, the conclusion from this extension is that (real) government debt also grows at this rate-(b1 -bo)lb = p-rather than remaining constant over time. It is now the ratio of debt to income, blY, that remains fixed at its initial value, b0IYo. The model therefore retains the property that the debt-income ratio is not determined within the model (by the values of GIY, r, p, or the form of the f-function) but is rather fixed at its historically given "initial" value. Suppose that current government expenditure departs by a fraction E from its trend value-that is, G1 = (1 + E)Go(l + p), and that the current value of income differs from its trend value by the fraction u-that is, Y1 = (1 + u)Yo(l + p), where Go and Y() are assumed (defined) to be along the respective trend lines. For convenience, I deal here with a case where the trend growth rates of G and Y are equal, since the main effect of unequal growth rates is brought out in equation (5). The expected departure of G from trend is assumed to persist (by the fraction e) fork periods, while the departure of Y from trend is assumed to persist (by the fraction u) for n periods.10 This specification could be generalized in obvious ways-for example, by altering the assumption that the anticipated fractional departures of G and Y away from trend, E and u, were precisely constant over k and n periods, respectively. However, the present setup brings out two significant elements: first, the role of the magnitude of the departure of current G and Y from trend and, second, the impact of the perceived duration of departures from trend.
Optimal public finance still requires a constant (planned) ratio of taxes to income at all points in time. Accordingly, from date n + 1 onward, planned taxes still grow along with income at rate p. However, because of the transitory (+ or -) income over the first n periods, the taxes over this interval depart from trend by the factor, 1 + u. Using these facts and the budget condition of equation (2) The above expression for m, derived from the government's budget constraint in equation (2), can be interpreted as follows. The term in the right-hand parentheses measures the "permanent" level of required finance-the trend value of expenditures, G0(1 + p), plus the interest on the initial debt less the part that is financed by issue of debt along with the trend growth of income, (r -p)bo, plus the effect of transitory expenditures. This last item is the amount of current transitory expenditure, EGO( 1 + p), multiplied by a factor that accounts for duration. As k > 0 (see n. 10 above) this factor approaches zero-that is, purely transitory current government expenditure has no effect on current taxation. As k -x o the factor approaches unity (assuming r < p)-signifying that the "transitory" component of government spending amounts in this case to permanent expenditure. Generally, the higher the expected duration of a given amount of current transitory government spending, the larger the amount of current taxation.
The other term on the right side of equation (6) accounts for transitory income. If the duration, n, of the departure of current income from trend were close to zero, then TI would be a multiple, 1 + u, of the permanent level of finance (in order to equate the current tax-income ratio to the future ratio). As n increases, the length of the period for which taxes will depart from trend by the factor (1 + u) rises, which (if u is positive) diminishes the required amount of current taxation. As n x> , the multiplication of trend income by (1 + u) becomes permanent, so that the first term on the right side of equation (6) approaches unity (assuming r > p). In this situation taxes correspond to the permanent level of finance at all times rather than being multiplied by (I + u) over an interval of finite length n. Generally, current taxes are an increasing function of the amount of current transitory income, as measured by (1 + u), and a decreasing function of the anticipated duration, n, of this transitory income.
With current taxes determined from equation (6), the current government deficit follows from the budget condition in equation ( The growth rate of debt in equation (7) The response of the deficit to the income term in equation (7) corresponds partly to the "automatic stabilizer" property of a tax system by which revenues rise and the deficit falls with income for a given set of tax laws.'2 These income-induced changes in tax revenues (and also in some components of federal expenditure) are, in principle, filtered out in the construction of a "full-employment surplus" (see U.S. Council of Economic Advisers [1962, pp. 78-81] for a discussion of this concept). However, the present analysis would also incorporate changes in the tax "structure"-which would usually be labeled as "discretionary" fiscal changes-that are a response to income fluctuations. Further, the present model rationalizes a system of tax laws that allows for an automatic procyclical pattern of revenues as a convenient mechanism for stabilizing the tax-income ratio. This " The model can also be used to analyze the effect of anticipated future blips in government expenditure or income. Current taxes and, hence, the current deficit would be affected here only to the extent that these anticipated future departures from normal have a substantial duration. The effects can be illustrated by the (p -y) term in eq. (5) from the model in which the trend growth rates of Y (p) and G ('y) were unequal. The anticipation of higher future values of income relative to government spending when p > y implies less incentive for current taxation. Therefore, the current deficit increases with p -y. Similarly, the expectation that future government expenditures-say, for social security benefits-will increase relative to income should stimulate current taxation and, hence, move the government budget toward surplus.
12 Any automatic response of government expenditure to income would be held constant by the G -G term in eq. (7). rationale derives here from efficiency in revenue generation and not from stabilization policy considerations. 13 The result in equation (7) implies that the debt-income ratio would be expected to remain constant on average but would rise in periods of abnormally high government spending or abnormally low aggregate income. However, as was also true in the simpler model above, the analysis does not determine a target or steady-state debt-income ratio. The ratio at any time reflects only the accumulation of realized values of government expenditure relative to normal and income relative to normal, which would have zero mean, ex ante, but do not have to add to zero, ex post. There is no force that causes the ratio of debt to income to approach some target value, which would itself depend on underlying parameters of the model.
In a more general model there may be a wide range within which the debt-income ratio can vary essentially freely in accordance with the shocks shown in equation (7), but there may be some eventual limits that come into play. A limit on the high side would arise when the debt-income ratio rises sufficiently to affect the probability of the government's default (n. 3 above). On the low side, public and private debts may become less perfect substitutes in terms of liquidity characteristics, etc., as the quantity of government bonds diminishes. The implied net worth aspect of public debt-corresponding to some monopoly power for the government in the sale of bonds-would then prescribe a target lower bound for the debt-income ratio. However, a zero value for B does not constitute a necessary lower bound, even if the B concept is limited to financial net worth (thereby not considering the value of governmentally owned real capital). There is nothing in the present analysis that rules out the possibility of the government's becoming a net creditor to the private sector. The last time this possibility arose for the federal government in the United States was in 1835 when the national debt was entirely paid off and the government sought desperately (!) for outlets for its surplus (Dewey 1931, p. 221). Apparently, the sharp contraction of 1837 solved this problem.
Changes in Prices
This section extends the model to allow for changes in the price level. Such changes enter the analysis because the government debt, which still takes the form of a one-period bond, is assumed to pay interest and principal in fixed nominal terms. Governmental finance through 13 McCallum and Whitaker (in press) argue for automatic stabilizers as a device for stabilizing the economy in an environment where information on aggregate variables becomes available only with a lag. currency issue is not considered here, and any price changes that occur are treated as exogenous with respect to the division of governmental finance between debt and taxes.'4 I first consider unanticipated price changes and then deal with anticipated inflation.
A one-time unexpected change in the price level can be modeled by allowing the current price level, P,, to differ from Po. Expectations of future price levels are assumed at this point to be static at P,-that is, Pt = PI for all t = 1, 2,.... LettingBt denote the stock of nominal debt outstanding at the end of period t, the government's budget constraint from equation (1) (1') where G and r are still in real terms, r is still assumed to be constant, and Pt = P, X Po for all t = 1, .... The entire analysis from before carries through in this case with the interpretation of the "real initial debt," bo, as B(^IP. Accordingly, in equation (7), the dependent variable is now the growth rate of nominal debt, (B, -&B)!B. On the right-hand side the first variable becomes PJ(G1 -G,)!BO, while the second now involves the term, (PIG1 + rB0)1BO. As the arbitrary length of the "period" becomes small, the difference in dating of the variables in these two expressions becomes unimportant. The principal result here is that one-time changes in the price level (or the current actual inflation rate in a continuous time setup) do not affect the change (growth rate) of the nominal debt. This conclusion should be somewhat surprising, since one-time changes in the price level do alter the ratio of (real) debt to (real) income. If the model determined a steady-state value of the debt-income ratio, a shift in the actual ratio would have temporary effects on the government deficit. These effects do not arise here because the model does not, in fact, determine this sort of steady-state ratio.
To model anticipated inflation, suppose now that prices are expected to change at the constant rate iT-that is, P, P= ( 1 + Tr)t. The nominal interest rate is given by R r + Tr. Although it is not crucial for present purposes, I assume that the real rate of interest, r, is invariant with inflation.'5 The previous analysis of the choice of taxes over time goes through completely in terms of real variablesincluding r. The only amendment to the previous analysis is that the 1 As with the invariance of the rate of return, this assumption would be valid as a first-order proposition if government bonds were not perceived as net wealth by the private sector.
" Some theoretical-basically indeterminate-analysis of this issue is surveyed in Barro and Fischer (I 976, sec. 3). If interest payments are subject to tax at rate 0, then the after-tax real rate of return is & = R(I -0) -ir. Independence of f from 7r requires R = (i + ir)/(l -0), so that R would have to move more than one to one with 7T in this circumstance. government budget constraint in equation (1') must be modified to reflect the distinction between the nominal and real interest ratethat is, the new specification is Gt + R (Bt-JlPt) = rt + (Bt -Bt_1)/P (1") where R -r + ,r. With taxes already set at the value determined in the preceding analysis (where ir = 0), it follows that the "extra part" of current interest payments, ir(Bt_,IPt), is financed entirely by extra issue of nominal debt. Equivalently, the growth rate of nominal debt, (B -Bt_)/Bt_1, is raised by the amount -an amount that is just sufficient to offset the expected effect of price changes on the real value of the outstanding stock of debt. Therefore, the incorporation of the anticipated inflation effect into equation (7) Accordingly, the nominal government debt grows, ceteris paribus, at the trend growth rate of nominal income, p + -. Note especially that it is the expected inflation rate, ir, and not the actual rate that influences the growth rate of nominal debt. The effects of the transitory government expenditure and income variables in equation (8) are the same as those discussed above.
Changes in the Rate of Return-Market versus Par Value of Government Debt
Abstracting for convenience from price-level changes, suppose now that the current rate of return on the one-period government debt, r, differs from that applicable in the previous period, r(1. It is assumed that anticipated rates of return for future periods are still equal to the current rate, r. In the case of the one-period debt that is being considered, the government's budget condition of equation (1) 
(1''')
where the b's refer throughout to the real par (initial) value of debt. These conditions can be shown to imply that the overall budget constraint is altered from the form of equation (3) The budget constraint now involves the market value of the initial debt, b = b,(I + ro)/(l + r), which is expressed as a present value at date 0 by means of the date 1 discount rate. Equation (3T) can be used to solve out for taxation over time, taking into account the constancy of the tax-income ratio in the optimal solution. The result is that the previous analysis goes through if all debt variables instead of being measured at par value are measured in terms of market value. Each market value is expressed as a present value at the corresponding date by means of the date 1 discount rate, r. (Note that the market value of debt at date 1, bi, is equal to b, for the case of one-period debt.) It is important to stress that the modified "deficit" variable that emerges from these calculations, b* -b , is not the change in the market value of debt as it would customarily be measured, but rather the difference in market value with the current discount rate, r, used in the calculations for both date I and date 0. and an average of rates applying to the outstanding debt, and the ratio, rI/r, appears instead of the difference, r -ro. It seems that in the general case r would have to be compared with a complicated "average" value of past interest rates that took account of both quantities and maturities of the existing stock of debt. An additional complication arises in using par value figures when some portion of the debt is not issued at par. In any case the basic result from this section is that an increase in r above the average of preceding rates would reduce the growth rate of debt when measured in terms of par values.
Empirical Analysis
An interesting way to test the theory would be to examine directly the hypothesis that the planned tax-income ratio was constant. Since changes in this ratio should then reflect only new information about the time path of government expenditures, etc., the theory has the implication that changes in tax rates should be unpredictable from knowledge of any lagged variables, including prior changes in rates. An approach for testing this type of hypothesis was developed for analogous propositions about consumption in Hall (1978) . The approach has obvious analogues to tests of efficient-markets hypotheses. I plan to explore this research avenue at a later time, but the present empirical investigation is limited to hypotheses and tests that directly concern public debt movements.
Setup of the Analysis
The form of the systematic part of the empirical equation to be applied to annual observations is derived from equation (8) The model implies also that certain variables would be irrelevant for the growth rate of public debt. In particular, the level of the outstanding stock of debt-relative, say, to the trend value of income-is excluded from equation (8). This proposition is tested by adding the variable, Bt_1/(Pt_1Yt_1)-the previous year's ratio of real debt to normal real income-to the estimating equation. The theory also stresses the role of temporary government expenditure rather than the level of spending. (See, however, n. 17 above for a possible effect of the level.) Hence, the effect of a variable like PtGt/Bt-normal government spending relative to the stock of debt-is worth examining.
Measures of Variables
The present analysis considers evidence on the determination of public debt in the United States since 1917. I hope to extend the investigation to earlier dates but have encountered some data prob-lems. One minor difficulty is that the available public debt data before 1916 refer to fiscal years, whereas the rest of the analysis is on a calendar-year basis. A more serious problem arises in the measurement of anticipated inflation (see below), which causes difficulties even for the post-1916 period.
The quantity of nominal debt, B, is measured as the outstanding stock of interest-bearing federal debt at par value in the hands of the . public" at the end of each calendar year.18 In particular, the figures net out holdings of debt by the Federal Reserve, Social Security Administration, etc. I have not carried out the computations that would be required to adjust the par value measures for changes in rates of return, as discussed above. (Note that a market-value series, even if it were available, would not be the appropriate construct for present purposes.) The earlier analysis suggests that a change-ininterest-rate variable should then be added to equation ( Finally, the P variable is measured by the average value of the GNP deflator for the year. Table 2 describes the estimates of equation (10) 
Empirical Results

Change in Interest Rate
An increase in interest rates should reduce the growth rate of public debt when measured at par values (see above). For the case where the R (1 -0) coefficient is constrained to one and for the 1922-76 sample, the estimated coefficient of the variable, RG, -RG,-, is -0.7, SE = 1.3. A failure to isolate a significant effect of this variable may stem from improper measurement, since RG_, should be replaced by an 25 However, over the 1948-76 period with the ir variable held fixed, the estimated constant is 0.015, SE = 0.007, which is well below the growth rate of real GNP. A possible interpretation is that the anticipated real rate of return for the post-1941 period is actually close to zero, and that the constant is below the growth rate because of the expectation that government spending will rise faster than income over time (see above). appropriately weighted average of past coupon rates. Therefore, the effect of this variable may be worth further examination. Table 3 
The Experience of Debt Issue from 1917 to 1976
Concluding Remarks
Natural extensions to the present analysis of public debt behavior have been noted in parts of the discussion above. Theoretical possibilities include the incorporation of currency issue, a rigorous application of optimal taxation theory to public debt determination (n. 7 above), and an explicit treatment of uncertainty about future government spending, national income, and so on. On an empirical level it would be useful to improve the measure of anticipated inflation to include a proper treatment of change-in-interest-rate effects, to test directly propositions concerning the unpredictability of federal tax rate changes, and to extend the analysis to earlier U.S. data. An investigation of the debt-creation process in the United Kingdom, which is currently being carried out by Benjamin and Kochin (1978) , should provide interesting comparative evidence.
I have also begun a study that utilizes the present analysis to examine the effects of shifts between public debt and taxes on economic activity. This analysis stresses the distinction between customary debt movements-which may be measurable as the estimated value from a public debt equation-and the surprise part of these shifts. Theoreti-cally, the latter parts would have a stronger impact on output-in fact, the former parts would be neutral in some models. However, my preliminary results have not isolated important output effects of either component of public debt movements. The public debt theory developed in the present paper suggests a possible difficulty in isolating the business-cycle effects of the temporary tax changes that are associated with the usual view of fiscal policy. If the theory has some empirical validity, so that the principal movements in federal tax rates have, in fact, represented permanent changes-in the sense that future changes in rates were unpredictable-then the historical data would not provide much evidence about the impact of temporary changes in federal taxes.
